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Abstract
The ‘catuskoti’ or tetralemma in Buddhist logic is a problematic
subject from the modern logical point of view. Recently a many-valued
paraconsistent logic was proposed in order to formalize catuskoti ad-
equately by G. Priest. On the other hand a slight modification of
the formalization of catuskoti seems to allow an appropriate inter-
pretation in the framework of the classical propositional calculus in
the mathematical logic developed by Russell-Whitehead and Hilbert-
Ackermann.
Key Words and Phrases. catuskoti, tetralemma, Buddhist logic,
propositional calculus
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1 Introduction
The catus.kot.i or tetralemma in Buddhist logic is the tuple of the four alter-
natives
A, not A, both A and not A, neither A nor not A, (1)
where A is a proposition or a predicate. From the modern logical point
of view it was investigated by K. N. Jayatilleke [5] (1967), D. S. Ruegg [9]
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(1977), R. D. Gunaratne [4] (1986), J. Westerhoff [12] (2006) and others. If
we insist the classical two-valued logic, this tuple may be formulated as
A, ¬A, A ∧ (¬A), ¬(A ∨ (¬A)). (2)
Here and hereafter we adopt the propositional calculus developed in [10]. The
definitions of symbols and terminology and axioms follow it except for using
the symbol ¬ instead of ∼. However the fourth alternative ¬(A ∨ (¬A)) of
(2) is equivalent to (¬A) ∧ A and to the third alternative if we are confined
to the classical logic. Therefore G. Priest [8] (2010) introduced a formal
logical machinery which may be more appropriate than the classical one. An
adequate formalization of the catus.kot.i requires a four-valued logic. See [8].
In this note, we introduce a modification of the catus.kot.i, and give an its
interpretation in the framework of the classical two-valued logic in the form
of the propositional calculus developed in [10, Chapter 2].
2 Modification and interpretation
Let us modify the tuple (2) replacing the third alternative A ∧ (¬A) by
A ∨ (¬A). That is, we consider the tuple of formulas
A, ¬A, A ∨ (¬A), ¬(A ∨ (¬A)). (3)
Here A is a formula of a propositional calculus Σ we consider. Of course
the third formula is identically true (a tautology, g), and the fourth formula
is identically false (a contradiction, uprise) in the usual semantics of the classical
propositional calculus.
The characterization of this tuple is as follows. Let us denote by L0 the
set of all sentence letters of Σ and by L the set of all formulas of Σ. A
mapping V from L0 into {0, 1} is called a valuation. If a valuation V is
given, it can be uniquely extended to a mapping from L into {0, 1} by dint
of the usual truth value tables. (0 stands for ‘false’, and 1 stands for ‘true’.)
Let us denote this unique extension by the same letter V in abbreviation.
Now we assume that there are a valuation V0 such that V0(A) = 0 and
a valuation V1 such that V1(A) = 1. In such a case we shall say that the
formula A is generic in the calculus Σ. Actually it is the case if A is one of
the sentence letters of Σ, that is, a member of L0. It is not the case if A is a
tautology or a contradiction.
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Then for any formula P the pair of truth values (V0(P ), V1(P )) should be
either (0, 1), (1, 0), (0, 0) or (1, 1). Therefore the set L of all formulas of Σ is
divided into the following four subsets:
L1 = {P ∈ L|(V0(P ), V1(P )) = (0, 1)},
L2 = {P ∈ L|(V0(P ), V1(P )) = (1, 0)},
L3 = {P ∈ L|(V0(P ), V1(P )) = (1, 1)},
L4 = {P ∈ L|(V0(P ), V1(P )) = (0, 0)}.
Moreover A,¬A,A ∨ (¬A),¬(A ∨ (¬A)) are representative formulas of
L1, L2, L3, L4, respectively. This is the situation of the modified tuple (3).
Hence the interpretation of this modified catus.kot.i is: If somebody denies
all these alternatives, then he/she intends to mean by abbreviation using the
representatives that he/she declares that the ultimate truth or the reality can-
not be described by any formula of any propositional calculus in which A is
a generic formula. Particularly any propositional calculus for which A is a
sentence letter doesn’t work to describe the reality.
Note. If a formula P is a contradiction uprise, like A ∧ (¬A), then
(V0(P ), V1(P )) = (0, 0). But the inverse is not true, that is, P is not nec-
essarily a contradiction when (V0(P ), V1(P )) = (0, 0). If Q is a tautology
g, then (V0(P ), V1(P )) = (1, 1), but the inverse is not true. In fact, as
an example, let us consider the case in which A is a sentence letter. Let
B be another sentence letter such that A 6= B. Then there are valua-
tions V0, V1 such that V0(A) = V0(B) = 1 and V1(A) = V1(B) = 0. Put
P = A ∧ (¬B) and Q = A ∨ (¬B). Then we have (V0(P ), V1(P )) = (0, 0)
and (V0(Q), V1(Q)) = (1, 1). But, since there is a valuation V2 such that
V2(A) = 1, V2(B) = 0 for which V2(P ) = 1 so that P is not a contradic-
tion. Since there is a valuation V3 such that V3(A) = 0, V3(B) = 1 for which
V3(Q) = 0 so that Q is not a tautology.
The idea to consider the pairs of the truth values is related to the philo-
sophical point of view of G. Priest [8]. For the details see the Appendix.
3 Tathagata after the death
As the first example we take a passage from ‘Khema Sutta’ (SN44.1) [15, p.
1381] in the ‘Samyutta Nikaya’:
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Q1: How is it, revered lady, does the Tathagata exist after death?
A1: Great king, the Blessed One has not declared this.
Q2: Then, revered lady, does the Tathagata not exist after death?
A2: Great king, the Blessed One has not declared this either.
Q3: Then does the Tathagata both exist and not exist after
death?
A3: Great king, the Blessed One has not declared this.
Q4: Well then, does the Tathagata neither exist nor not exist
after death?
A4: Great king, the Blessed One has not declared this either.
Q5: Now, what is the cause and reason, why that has not been
declared by the Blessed One?
A5: That form by which one describing the Tathagata might de-
scribe him has been abandoned by the Tathagata. The Tathagata
is liberated from reckoning in terms form; he is deep, immeasur-
able, hard to fathom like the great ocean. That feeling by which
one describing....That perception by which one describing...,...
Therefore our modification is to replace Q3 by
Q3’: Then does the Tathagata either exist or not exist after death? Can
both be allowed?
According our interpretation we can say that A5 explains that why the re-
ality is beyond the set of all formulas of any calculus in which “the Tathagata
exists after death” is formalized by a generic formula.
Now the corresponding original Pali text reads
Q1: Kinnu kho ayye hoti tatha¯gato parammaran. a¯ti.
A1: Avya¯katam. etam. maha¯ra¯ja bhagavata¯:“hoti tatha¯gato parammaran.a”ti.
Q2: Kimpanayyo na hoti tatha¯gato parammaran. a¯ti.
A2: Etampi kho maha¯ra¯ja avya¯katam. bhagavata¯: “ na hoti tatha¯gato
parammaran. a¯”ti.
Q3: Kinnu kho ayye, hoti ca na ca hoti tatha¯gato parammaran. a¯ti.
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A3: Avya¯katam. kho etam. maha¯ra¯ja bhagavata¯:“ hoti ca na ca
hoti tatha¯gato parammaran. a¯”ti.
Q4: Kimpanayye, neva hoti na na hoti tatha¯gato parammaran. a¯ti.
A4: Etampi kho maha¯ra¯ja avya¯katam. bhagavata¯: “neva hoti na
na hoti tatha¯gato parammaran. a¯”ti.
Thus the tuple of the four alternatives in the Pali is
A, na A, A ca na ca A, neva A na na A. (4)
According to our modification the third alternative ‘A ca na ca A’ is
formalized by A ∨ (¬A).
The essential point lies on the difference between A ∨ (¬A) and A ∧
(¬A).We wonder whether the formalization as A ∧ (¬A) of the translation
‘both A and not A’ is inevitable or not.
Let us look at Chinese translations. We could not find a Chinese transla-
tion of this ‘Khema Sutta’, but Chinese translations by Gunabhadra of other
many suttas in the group ‘Avyakata Samyutta’ of ‘Samyutta Nikaya’ can be
found in the Chinese ‘Za´ E¯ha´n-j¯ing ’. See ‘The Taisho Tripitaka’ 99-958,
-959, -960, -962. The Chinese translation of the four alternatives are:
(Ru´la´i) yoˇu ho`usˇi, wu´ ho`usˇi, yoˇu wu´ ho`usˇi, fe¯i yoˇu fe¯i wu´ ho`usˇi
or
yoˇu ho`usˇi, wu´ ho`usˇi, yoˇu wu´ ho`usˇi, fe¯i yoˇu ho`usˇi fe¯i wu´ ho`usˇi.
Thus the tuple of the four alternatives in the Chinese is
A, ¬A, A ¬A, fe¯i A fe¯i ¬A. (5)
Since ‘yoˇu’ = to have, ‘wu´’=to lack, ‘fe¯i’ =not, ‘ho`usˇi’ =after death, the
conjunctions ‘and’ ,‘or’ do not appear explicitly. In usual conversations, “Yoˇu
wu´” (or “Yoˇu me´iyou” colloquially) does not mean “One has and lacks”, but
means “(Do you) have or don’t have?”. In the same way “Haˇo buhaˇo”, not
meaning “It’s good and bad”, means “Is it good or not?”, or “ How do you
think?”, where ‘haˇo’=good and ‘bu`’=not. Therefore the putting side by side
without conjunction ‘A ¬A’ should be interpreted as A∨ (¬A) in these cases
as our modification.
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Remark 1. Let us note the following passage in ‘Kaccayanagotta Sutta’
(SN12.15) [15, p. 544]:
“All exists”: this is one extreme. “All does not exists”: this
is the second extreme. Without veering towards either of these
extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma by the middle:
“With ignorance as condition, volitional formations come to be,...
In the Pali
Sabbamatth¯i’ti kho kacca¯na ayameko anto. Sabbam. natth¯i’ti
ayam. dutiyo anto. Ete te kacca¯na ubho ante anupagamma ma-
jjhena tatha¯gato dhammam. deseti. Avijja¯paccaya¯ san.kha¯ra¯.
San.kha¯rapaccaya¯ ...
Here we have the tuple of two alternatives
A, ¬A
or, in the Pali here,
A, n’A.
The interpretation of this tuple is clear. Let A be a formula and V a
valuation. The set L of all formulas is divided into the subset L1/2 of all
formulas P such that V (P ) = 0 and the subset L2/2 of formulas P such
that V (P ) = 1. Then A,¬A are representatives of L1/2, L2/2 respectively if
V (A) = 0, while otherwise they are representatives of L2/2, L1/2 respectively.
Hence our interpretation of this dilemma is: If somebody denies both two
alternatives, he/she intends to mean by abbreviation that any formula of any
propositional calculus in which A is a formula cannot describe the reality.
In other words, the denial of both A and ¬A is nothing but the denial of
A ∨ (¬A), which is a tautology, and it leads to the denial of all formulas in
the propositional calculus considered, since, for any formula P , the formula
P → A∨ (¬A) is a tautology, too. Of course this argument is an intentional
confusion of the object logic and the metalogic. Anyway, this dilemma may
be a prototype of the catus.kot.i or tetralemma.
Also see ‘Aggi-Vacchagotta Sutta’ (MN72) [14, p. 590] in the ‘Majjhima
Nikaya’, which contains both dilemmas and tetralemmas.
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4 Creator of suffering
As the second example we take a passage from ‘Acela Sutta’ (SN12.17) [15,
p. 546] in the ‘Samyutta Nikaya’. The English translation reads:
Q1: Master Gotama, is suffering created by oneself?
A1: Not so, Kassapa.
Q2: Then, Master Gotama, is suffering created by another?
A2: Not so, Kassapa.
Q3: Then, Master Gotama, is suffering created both by oneself
and by another?
A3: Not so, Kassapa.
Q4: Then, Master Gotama, has suffering arisen fortuitously, be-
ing created neither by oneself nor by another?
A4: Not so, Kassapa.
...
Q7: Teach me about suffering, Blessed One!
A7: “The one who acts is the one who experiences the result of
the act” amounts to the eternalist statement “suffering is created
by oneself”. “The one who acts is someone other than the one
who experiences the result of the act” amounts to the annihi-
lationist statement “suffering is created by another”. Without
veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathagata teaches
the Dhamma by the middle: With ignorance as condition voli-
tional formations come to be; With volitional formations...
At the moment the English translation can be formulated as
A, B, A ∧ B, ¬(A ∨B), (6)
but we modify it as
A, B, A ∨B, ¬(A ∨ B) (7)
by replacing the third alternative as in §2. Here A stands for ‘suffering is
created by oneself ” and B stands for ‘suffering is created by another’. Ac-
cording to A7, we could assume that B is equivalent to ¬A. But according
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to Q4, it seems that one can consider ‘suffering arises fortuitously (or with-
out any cause, as a result of chance) ’ even if suffering is created neither by
oneself nor by another. Therefore we do not assume that B is equivalent to
¬A. Our modification means that Q3 is replaced by
Q3’: Then is it created either by oneself or by another? Can both be
allowed?
This modified catus.kot.i can be characterized as follows. Let A and B
be formulas in a propositional calculus Σ. First we assume that there are
a valuation V0 such that V0(A) = 0 and V0(B) = 1 and a valuation V1
such that V1(A) = 1 and V1(B) = 0. If it is the case, let us say that A
and B is separable or independent. Of course it is the case if A and B
are distinct sentence letters of Σ. For any formula P the pair of the truth
values (V0(P ), V1(P )) should be one of (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1), (0, 0). Clearly the
formulas of the tuple (7) are representatives of the four possible cases. The
situation is same as in §2, where B is ¬A. But we do not assume here
that A ∨ B is identically true and ¬(A ∨ B) is identically false. Therefore
our interpretation is that, when somebody denies all the four alternatives of
(7), then he/she intends to mean in abbreviation that the reality cannot be
described by any formula of any propositional calculus in which A and B are
independent formulas.
By the way the original Pali text reads:
Q1: Kinnu kho bho gotama, sayam. katam. dukkhanti?
A1: Ma¯ hevam. kassapa¯.
Q2: Kimpana bho gotama, parakatam. dukkhanti?
A2: Ma¯ hevam. kassapa¯.
Q3: Kinnu kho bho gotama, sayam. katan˜ca parakatan˜ca dukkhanti?
A3: Ma¯ hevam. kassapa¯.
Q4: Kimpana bho gotama, asayam. ka¯ram. aparaka¯ram. adhiccasamuppannam.
dukkhanti?
A4: Ma¯ hevam. kassapa¯.
Therefore the tuple of the four alternatives in Pali is
A, B, A-ca B-ca, a-A a-B. (8)
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So we wonder whether ‘A-ca B-ca’ can be formalized as A ∨ B or not.
The Chinese translation (‘Taisho Tripitaka’ 99-302) reads:
Q1: Yu´nhe´ Qu´ta´n , kuˇ z`ızuo` ye´?
A1: Kuˇ z`ızuo` zhe, cˇi sh`ı wu´j`ı.
Q2: Yu´nhe´ Qu´ta´n, kuˇ ta¯zuo` ye´?
A3: Kuˇ ta¯zuo` zhe, cˇi y`ı wu´j`ı.
Q3: Kuˇ z`ıta¯zuo` ye´?
A3: Kuˇ z`ıta¯zuo`, cˇi y`ı wu´j`ı.
Q4: Yu´nhe´ Qu´ta´n, kuˇ fe¯i z`ı fe¯i ta¯, wu´y¯in zuo` ye´?
A4: Kuˇ fe¯i z`ı fe¯i ta¯, cˇi y`ı wu´j`ı.
Thus the tuple of the four alternative in Chinese is
A, B, A B, fe¯i A fe¯i B. (9)
We note that no conjunctions like ‘and’ ‘or’ do not appear explicitly.
Remark 2. Since A∧B entails A∨B, one who denies the third alternative
of our modified catus.kot.i simultaneously denies the third alternative of the
usual catus.kot.i. (Note that A∧B is identically false if B = ¬A, but otherwise
it can take the truth value 1 for a certain valuation.) According to [11, p. 11],
Tson-kha-pa’s annotation to ‘Madhyamakaka¯rika¯’ I, 1 explains that A ∧ B
is the philosophical position of Nyaya-Vaisesika school, and ¬(A∨B) is that
of Lokayata school, where A stands for “It arises from itself”, B stands for
“It arises from other ” and “It arises without cause (or by chance)” entails
¬(A ∨ B). Therefore if somebody denies all A,B,A ∨ B,¬(A ∨ B), he/she
denies A ∧ B a fortiori.
Remark 3. Let us note the following passage in ‘Samanupassana Sutta’
(SN22.47) [15, p. 886] in the ‘Samyutta Nikaya’:
The thought “I will be percipient”, “I will be non-percipient”
and “I will be neither percipient nor non-percipient” –these do
not occur.
Or in the Pali
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Ayamahamasmiti’pissa na hoti, bhavissanti’pissa na hoti, na bhavis-
santi’pissa na hoti, san˜n˜¯i bhavissanti’pissa na hoti, asan˜n˜¯i bhavis-
santi’pissa na hoti, nevasan˜n˜¯ina¯san˜n˜i bhavissanti’pissa na hot¯iti.
Here we find the trilemma
A, B, ¬(A ∨B), (10)
where A stands for ‘I will be percipient’ and B stands for ‘I will be non-
percipient”, which formalizes
A, B, neither A nor B.
Or the trilemma
A, ¬A, ¬(A ∨ (¬A)) (11)
formalizes
A, a-A, neva-A na¯-A,
where A stands for ‘san˜n˜¯i bhavissanti’.
The trilemma (10) lacks the third alternative of the tetralemma (7). How-
ever, when somebody denies all the alternatives of the trilemma (10), he/she
implicitly denies the third alternative A∨B of the tetralemma (7) too, since
the denial of both A and B entails the denial of A ∨ B provided that we
hold the classical logic as the metalogic. Therefore the interpretation of the
trilemma (10) or (11) is the same as that of the tetralemma (7) or (3). In
other words this trilemma is equivalent to the tetralemma.
5 Dual modification
An alternative modification of catus.kot.i could be given by replacing (7) by
the tuple
A, B, A ∧ B, ¬(A ∧B). (12)
In this tuple (12) the third alternative coincides with the usual translation
of catus.kot.i, but the fourth alternative is formalized in different way to the
usual one.
When B = ¬A, the tuple (12) turns out to be
A, ¬A, A ∧ (¬A), ¬(A ∧ (¬A)) (13)
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instead of (3). The components of the tuple (13) are representatives of
L1, L2, L4, L3 respectively, where Lj , j = 1, 2, 3, 4, are the subsets of for-
mulas defined in §2. Thus the interpretation of this alternative modification
of catus.kot.i is the same, that is, If somebody denies all these alternatives,
then he/she intends to mean by abbreviation using the representatives that
he/she declares that the ultimate truth or the reality cannot be described by
any formula of any propositional calculus in which A is a generic formula.
Particularly any propositional calculus for which A is a sentence letter doesn’t
work to describe the reality.
In fact the pair of the third and fourth alternatives of (13) is the mere
exchange of those of (3). On the other hand, the relation between (12) and (7)
can be different from a mere exchange of order if B is not ¬A. But the tuple
of the subsets of formulas considered in §4 represented by the components of
(12) coincides with those of (7) except for the order.
The possibility of this formalization ¬(A ∧ (¬A)) of the fourth alterna-
tive of catus.kot.i was discussed by J. Westerhoff in [12, footnote of page 375].
He discusses not on Pali texts but on Sanskrit text by Na¯ga¯rjuna, and his
opinion seems that this interpretation is impossible.
Let us note that in ‘Sikkha Sutta’ (AN 4.99) [16, p. 479] of the ‘Anguttara
Nikaya’ the Blessed One says:
Bhikkhus, there are four kinds of persons found existing in the
world. What four? One who is practicing for his own welfare but
not for the welfare of others; one who is practicing for the welfare
of others but not for his own welfare; one who is practicing neither
for his own welfare nor for the welfare of others; and one who is
practicing both for his own welfare and for the welfare of others.
Here we can find the tetralemma
A ∧ (¬B), (¬A) ∧B, (¬A) ∧ (¬B), A ∧B,
where A stands for ‘he is practicing for his own welfare’ and B stands for
‘he is practicing for the welfare of others’. Note that in the Pali this passage
reads:
Attahitta¯ya pat.ipanno no parahita¯ya; Parahita¯ya pat.ipanno no
attahita¯ya; Neva attahita¯ya ca pat.ipanno no parahita¯ya; At-
tahita¯ya ca pat.ipanno parahita¯ya ca.
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That is
A no B, B no A, neva A ca no B, A ca B ca.
The Chinese translation of the similar ‘Valahaka Sutta’ (AN 4.102) is found
as Taisho 125-25.10. The tuple in the Chinese is
A e´r bu` B, B e´r bu` A, y`ı bu` A y`ı bu` B, y`ı A y`ı B.
Here the Blessed One does not intend to deny the four alternatives, but
intends merely to classify people, although He may agree with the opinion
that one which satisfies A ∧ B is the most excellent and sublime. It is not
the case that the four alternatives are affirmed simultaneously for a single
person. By the Chinese translation Taisho 125-25.10 of AN 4.102 this is
explicitly expressed as
Huo` yoˇu yu´n le´i e´r bu` yu`, huo` yoˇu yu´n yu` e´r bu` le´i, huo` ...,
where “yoˇu yu´n le´i e´r bu` yu`” means ‘there is a cloud which thunders and
does not rain’ and so on, and “huo`” means the disjunction, that is, “Huo` ...,
huo` ...” means “Either ... or ....”, or, more precisely speaking, “On the one
hand ..., on the other hand,...” in this context. Here “e´r” = ‘and’, “huo`” =
‘or’ are explicit conjunction words.
Although we cannot give a clear example in which all the alternatives are
affirmed simultaneously, we would like to spend few words about affirmative
catus.kot.i in which all the four alternatives are affirmed.
Let the tuple (7) be called the modified catus.kot.i generated by A, B
and the tuple (12) be called the dual modified catus.kot.i generated by
A, B. Therefore the tuple (3) is the modified catus.kot.i generated by A,¬A,
and (13) is the dual modified catus.kot.i generated by A,¬A.
Then it is easy to see under the classical propositional calculus that the
dual modified catus.kot.i (13) generated by A,¬A is equivalent to the modified
catus.kot.i generated by A,¬A except for the exchange of the order of the
alternatives, since
A ∧ (¬A) ⇔ ¬(A ∨ (¬A)), ¬(A ∧ (¬A)) ⇔ A ∨ (¬A).
Now suppose that somebody denies all the alternatives of the dual mod-
ified catus.kot.i generated by ¬A,¬B, that is,
¬A, ¬B, (¬A) ∧ (¬B), ¬((¬A) ∧ (¬B)).
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If we formalize this metalogical denial by the operation ¬ on all the alter-
natives in the object symbol logic, then the result is easily seen to be the
modified catus.kot.i generated by A,B, that is, (7). In this sense the affir-
mation of (7) is nothing but the negation of the dual catus.kot.i generated
by ¬A,¬B. Here the affirmation means affirmation of all the alternatives,
and the negation means denial of all the alternatives. We note that A,B are
independent if and only if ¬A,¬B are independent.
Therefore we can say that the affirmation of the modified catus.kot.i (3) is
nothing but the negation of (3) itself . Of course this argument is a confusion
of the object logic and the metalogic, but the conclusion, the coincidence of
affirmation with negation, is a dialectical situation in a sense. So, if we want
to formalize this argument as the total, we should adopt a paraconsistent
logic, maybe.
Remark 4. Na¯ga¯rjuna’s Mu¯lamadhyamakaka¯rika¯ XVIII.8 is a problem-
atic verse, which reads:
Everything is real and is not real,
Both real and not real,
Neither real nor not real.
This is Lord Buddha’s teaching.
According to J. L. Garfield, [3, p. 250], in contrast with [6, p.113], this
verse is an example of affirmative catus.kot.i without intention of denial, and
Na¯ga¯rjuna here intends merely to mean “Everything is conventionally real,
and is ultimately unreal; Everything has both characteristics; Nothing is
ultimately real”. Therefore the opinion of Garfield may be that a reading
of this verse as an affirmative catus.kot.i which is equivalent to the negative
catus.kot.i dialectically as above is a nihilistic one which is very hard to sustain.
See [3, Footnote 93, p.251].
6 Finitude and infinitude of the world
We can find the following passage called anta¯natava¯da argument in ‘Brah-
maja¯la Sutta’ (DN 1) in the ‘Digha Nikaya’ [13, p.78]:
P0: There are some ascetics or brahmins who proclaim the fini-
tude and infinitude of the world on four grounds. What four?
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P1: A certain ascetic or brahmin thinks: “This world is finite and
bounded. ([Pali] antava¯ ayam. loko parivat.umo; [Chinese] sh`ıjia¯n
yoˇubia¯n. )”
P2: A certain ascetic or brahmin thinks: “This world is infinite
and unbounded. ([Pali] anato ayam. loko apariyanto; [Chinese]
sh`ıjia¯n wu´bia¯n.) Those who say it is finite are wrong. ”
P3: A certain ascetic or brahmin, perceiving the world as finite
up-and-down, and infinite across ([Chinese] sha`ngfa¯ng yoˇubia¯n
s`ıfa¯ng wu´bia¯n ), thinks: “The world is finite and infinite. ([Pali]
antava¯ ca ayam. loko ananto ca; [Chinese] sh`ıjia¯n yoˇubia¯n wu´bia¯n.
) Those who say it is finite are wrong, and those who say it is
infinite are wrong.”
P4: A certain ascetic or brahmin argues: “This world is neither
finite nor infinite. ([Pali] neva¯yam. loko antava¯ na pana¯nanto;
[Chinese] sh`ıjia¯n fe¯i yoˇubia¯n fe¯i wu´bia¯n.) Those who say it is
finite are wrong, and so those who say it is infinite, and those
who say it is finite and infinite.”
P5: These are the four ways. There is no other way.
Let us try to formalize this argument.
Consider the tuple
A ∧ (¬B), (¬A) ∧B, A ∧ B, (¬A) ∧ (¬B), (14)
where A and B are formulas. (This tuple is that of AN 4.99 mentioned in
§5 except for the exchange of the order of the alternatives.) We can consider
that this is the proper (unmodified) catus.kot.i. Hereafter we denote
by C1, C2, C3, C4 the alternatives of the tuple (14). It is easy to verify the
properties
Ci ∧ Cj ⇔ uprise if i 6= j, (15)
and
C1 ∨ C2 ∨ C3 ∨ C4 ⇔ g, (16)
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by using the auxiliary truth-value table:
A B C1 C2 C3 C4
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0
Of course, whenB = ¬A, the tuple (14) is equivalent to (2), say, A,¬A,uprise,uprise,
and this is not interesting as pointed in §1. However we can consider the case
in which A is ∃xFx and B is ∃x¬Fx, where F is a one-place predicate and x
is a variable. Here we adopt the classical predicate calculus developed in [10,
Chapter 4]. In this case it is easy to verify that the tuple (14) is equivalent
to
∀xFx, ∀x¬Fx, (∃xFx) ∧ (∃x¬Fx), ∀x(Fx ∧ (¬Fx)), (17)
since
¬∃x¬Fx ⇔ ∀xFx, ¬∃xFx ⇔ ∀x¬Fx.
Here actually we have C4 ⇔ uprise but C3 can be nonequivalent to uprise when
the domain of the variable x contains distinct elements.
So, this catus.kot.i may formalize the anta¯natava¯da argument very well, if
we consider that Fx stands for ‘the world is finite and bounded with respect
to the direction x’. In fact, if a stands for ‘up-and-down’ and b stands for
‘east-west-south-and-north’, the third ascetic or brahmin believes that both
Fa and ¬Fb are true, therefore, C3 is true. Moreover we note that the tuple
C1, C2, C3, C4
is clearly equivalent to the tuple
C1, C2 ∧ (¬C1), C3 ∧ (¬C1) ∧ (¬C2), C4 ∧ (¬C1) ∧ (¬C2) ∧ (¬C3)
as described in the text of the Sutta little bit redundantly.
In view of (15)(16) the saying P5 of the Blessed One is exact. If somebody
denies all the alternatives Ci, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, as not to be attached, then the
result is the absolute empty, or ‘nibbuti’ (=nibba¯na, perfect peace beyond
reasoning) and ‘anupa¯da¯-vimutta’ (emancipation without clinging).
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Appendix
Let us consider a propositional calculus Σ and an arbitrary pair of valua-
tions v1 and v2 in Σ. Let us denote v(P ) = (v1(P ), v2(P )) for any formula P of
Σ. Then v(P ) can take one of the four vector values (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (0, 0).
Let us denote
b = (1, 0), n = (0, 1), t = (1, 1), f = (0, 0).
Now, by tedious calculations, it can be verified that the performance of
the four truth values v obeys the following tables:
¬
t f
b n
n b
f t
∨ t b n f
t t t t t
b t b t b
n t t n n
f t b n f
∧ t b n f
t t b n f
b b b f f
n n f n f
f f f f f
→ t b n f
t t b n f
b t t f f
n t b t b
f t t t t
Therefore we have a semantics for a four-valued logic, which is similar
to that of Dunn for FDE (Finite Degree Entailment) adopted by G. Priest
[8, §3.2] with the Hasse diagram in [8, p.33]. The different point is that
the value of a negation ¬ is fixed for b and n while it toggles t and f in
the FDE semantics but it toggles b and n, too, for our case. On the other
hand, suggested by Y. Deguchi, J. Garfield and G. Priest, 2008, [2, pp. 398-
399], A. J. Cotnoir [1] introduces the semantics B4, in which the value of a
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negation ¬ toggles b and n, too. In other words, using the symbol and the
interpretations of [1], we can put
〈1, 1〉(= both CT and UF) := b = (1, 0)
〈1, 0〉(= CT but not UF) := t = (1, 1)
〈0, 1〉(= not CT but UF) := f = (0, 0)
〈0, 0〉(= neither CT nor UF) := n = (0, 1),
where ‘CT’ stands for ‘conventionally true’ and ‘UF’ stands for ‘ultimately
false’. Then the semantics for our pairing of valuations v = (v1, v2) coincides
with that of B4. (Note that if, we are not sure but, ‘not UF’ is equivalent to
‘ultimately true’, then v1(A) = 1 [(0)] iff the proposition A is conventionally
true [( false )] and v2(A) = 1 [(0)] iff the proposition A is ultimately true [(
false )].) In this sense our interpretation of the modified catus.kot.i, if we take
v1 = V0, v2 = V1, is compatible with the paraconsistent point of view of Y.
Deguchi, J. Garfield and G. Priest formalized by A. J. Cotnoir.
But a more appropriate semantical formulation of catus.kot.i has been
presented by T. Onishi, who appeals to the concept ‘bilattice’. The details
will be given in [7].
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